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Introduction 
Financial instruments in the form of loans, guarantees and equity have long been 
important economic development policy measures in many countries, but have only 
recently become prominent in EU Cohesion Policy. The growing interest in financial 
instruments at the EU level partly owes to the perceived ³sustainability´ benefits of 
repayable instruments against the backdrop of budgetary constraints. Reflecting this, the 
European Commission has increasingly emphasised the role that financial instruments 
can play in the delivery of Cohesion Policy. In 1994-99, European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF) spend in the form of financial instruments was estimated at just 
EUR 300 million, rising to some EUR 1.2 billion in 2000-06 (CSES, 2007); the most 
recent summary of financial instrument spend for 2007-13 (European Commission, 2016) 
shows ERDF and European Social Fund (ESF) Operational Programme (OP) 
commitments to financial instruments of just over EUR 12 billion.1 In 2014-20, the role 
of financial instruments is being reinforced further, with the Commission encouraging 
member states to double the use of financial instruments in European Structural and 
Investment Funds (ESIF), in line with the objectives of the Investment Plan for Europe 
(European Commission, 2014). Implementation of the 2014-20 plans remains at a 
comparatively early stage, especially in the case of financial instruments, but indications 
from the operational programmes are that member states planned to commit over 
EUR 20 billion on financial instruments.2 That said, it is important to note that the vast 
bulk of ESIF spend remains in the form of grants: even if the increase in ESIF financial 
instrument commitments from EUR 12 billion to EUR 20 billion materialises in 2014-20, 
this will only represent around 6% of total ESIF commitments, as opposed to about 4% 
in 2007-13.  
Against this background, the aim of this paper is to explore the experiences related to 
the use of financial instruments and policies to encourage their uptake, as relevant to the 
remit of the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy (DG REGIO) of the 
European Commission.3 It draws on the experiences with financial instruments, 
principally in the EU member states, and considers both purely domestic and co-financed 
instruments. This paper complements a contribution by Ross Brown and Neil Lee which 
offers a theoretical perspective on the circumstances in which financial instruments are 
particularly effective and the limits to their usefulness (Brown and Lee, 2017). By 
contrast, the present paper has a more practical focus and aims to address the following 
questions posed by the European Commission and the OECD in advance of the seminar: 
x Which sectors would benefit the most from financial instruments, what limits the 
uptake of financial instruments in these sectors and how can they be encouraged 
to make greater use of them? 
x What are the institutional framework conditions and complementary policy 
measures that need to be in place to use financial instruments? 
x How do regulatory frameworks promote or limit the use of financial instruments? 
x What capacity do businesses and public administrations need to apply for and use 
financial instruments and how can it be strengthened? 
x How can the administrative burden of applying for and using financial instruments be 
reduced? 
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS IN PRACTICE: UPTAKE AND LIMITATIONS © OECD 2018                                                                                                                                                   5 
In considering these questions, the paper is structured as follows: the next section sets 
out some key issues of scope and context in considering the use of financial instruments; 
the following section considers the kinds of activities for which financial instruments are 
relevant, the extent to which they are currently used for these purposes under Cohesion 
Policy and illustrates the main areas where financial instruments might be relevant and 
drawing on domestic and co-financed examples; the paper then identifies some of the key 
preconditions for the successful implementation of financial instruments, focusing 
especially on support for enterprises, for which there is most experience, but also drawing 
on practice in other policy areas; the final section concludes.  
Scope and context 
The term ³financial instrument´4 is now firmly embedded in Cohesion Policy parlance,5 
but in fact embraces an array of financial products that not only operate in diverse ways, 
but are of widely differing orders of scale, address a variety of policy objectives, use 
various modes of governance and function within assorted socio-economic, institutional and 
geographic contexts. The common thread is essentially that financial instruments provide 
funding that is intended to be repayable. The important issue here is that a high degree of 
granularity is required in analysing the key issues involved in the design and implementation 
of financial instruments. 
The conventional breakdown of financial products distinguishes loans, guarantees and 
equity, but there are a number of possible variants on these, as well as scope to combine 
measures to meet the needs of both the funder and the final recipient.  
x Loans are the most widely used source of private finance for small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) and are offered almost everywhere in domestic and/or 
co-financed economic development policies; loans are also widely used by other 
project promoters, such as local authorities, for upgrading public buildings and 
spaces and other capital investments, and householders and landlords for energy 
renovation. Loans are comparatively easy to administer from a public administration 
perspective, to the extent that the implementation of a loan fund can be ³outsourced´ 
or funds can essentially be used to increase the volume of finance available 
through existing commercial sources. Loan products can help address credit 
rationing, as well as cost-of-credit issues (through interest rate subsidies or easier 
terms). Loans are often preferred by SMEs because there is no loss of control or 
ownership, as with equity, but they can lack the flexibility required by young firms. 
x Guarantees are arguably the most straightforward financial product to design, 
implement and recalibrate as economic development needs change. They have 
most potential for impact where collateral-based lending is the norm and the 
business population is not asset-rich. The use of guarantees (in domestic and 
Cohesion Policy) is significant in only a few countries, and the sums covered are, 
on average, often modest, partly because they are frequently combined with loans 
in microfinance packages for start-ups and young firms. However, where they are 
used, their reach can be significant, with many thousands of publicly backed 
guarantees offered annually in some countries.  
x Publicly backed equity or venture capital is the least used of the three 
³conventionally defined´ financial products and is often regarded as a ³niche´ 
product for potentially fast-growing innovative firms. Private equity markets vary 
widely across Europe and equity and venture capital are not prominent sources of 
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finance for SMEs, especially smaller ones. Indeed, across Europe, over 80% of 
SMEs consider that ³equity is not applicable to my firm´ (European Commission, 
2013). Equity products can provide significant amounts of medium- to long-term 
capital, but imply at least some loss of management control by founders and are 
typically more difficult to manage for public authorities. 
The scale of financial instruments also varies widely. Summary information on co-
financed financial instruments (European Commission, 2016) suggests that some 975 funds 
were set up in the 2007-13 programming period, but the 15 largest of these account for 
approaching half of all payments to funds. There are several funds which exceed 
EUR 200 million ± the largest being the Italian Research and Competiveness OP Guarantee 
Fund, which totalled EUR 871 million; however, the average fund size is around 
EUR 20 million and there are large numbers of funds of less than EUR 1 million. 
Differences in financial scale partly reflect their geographical scope, with most of the 
very large funds (over EUR 200 million) operating on a national or multi-regional basis. 
There is no comparative or systematic source of information on non-cofinanced financial 
instruments; indeed such instruments are both diverse and opaque, in part owing to the 
rebranding of financial products (Whittle, Malan and Bianchini, 2016), which renders an 
overall quantification of public funds for financial instruments an impossible task (Michie 
and Wishlade, 2015). 
The policy objectives of financial instruments for economic development embrace a 
spectrum of specific aims. The principal focus is on addressing perceived gaps in the 
availability of finance to SMEs, but this itself is a varied segment, with prospective 
recipients including high-growth firms, high-tech spin-out companies, ³mainstream´ 
SMEs and well as individuals seeking self-employment. Within the overarching aim of 
supporting business development, these groups require quite different approaches in 
terms of financial product and delivery mechanisms, with specialised fund managers 
required for some, but relatively standardised banking products suitable for others. The 
2007-13 Structural Fund regulations also made explicit provision for financial instruments 
for urban development and later for those for energy efficiency and renewable energy 
sources. The substance of financial instruments for these policy areas, and the way in 
which the instruments function, is different again from support for businesses, with final 
recipients also including public authorities, housing associations, landlords and private 
householders. As discussed below, the 2014-20 Regulations open the possibility of using 
financial instruments for all of the so-called thematic objectives covered by the ESIF.  
The governance of financial instruments is very much context-driven: co-financed 
funds can be operated within holding funds, or ³funds of funds´, or as specific funds 
outwith a fund of funds. Often the European Investment Bank plays a significant role in 
holding fund management. In some countries, the implementation of co-financed instruments 
relies heavily on existing institutions ± especially promotional banks ± providing an 
additional block of funding to supplement domestic sources. In others, holding funds 
and/or specific funds maybe be procured and/or established as separate legal entities.  
Away from ESIF co-financed measures, the domestic scene is varied, but three main 
approaches can be distinguished (Michie and Wishlade, 2015): 
1. investment funds with a remit essentially limited to SME development: 
Innovation SME+ (Netherlands), Vaekstfonden (Denmark) and Industrifonden 
(Sweden) fall into this category 
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2. public financial institutions which operate more than one fund (or funds of funds) 
and often collaborate with other organisations, but whose focus remains on 
business development, especially SMEs: Finnvera (Finland), Land business banks 
(Germany), Bpi (France), Strategic Banking Corporation of Ireland (Ireland), 
Finance Wales and British Business Bank (United Kingdom) 
3. public banks whose operations are on a more significant scale and extend into 
areas beyond SME development into infrastructure, lending to local authorities 
and potentially international operations: KfW (Germany), BGK (Poland), ICO 
(Spain), Land banks (Germany). 
A notable trend is the emergence of new promotional banks in countries where they 
did not exist previously, and a strengthening of their mandates, largely in response to the 
impact of the financial crisis and the loss of investor confidence in the aftermath.  
Last, it is important to emphasise the variety of contexts in which financial instruments 
operate and to which, at least in part, they are intended to respond. There are significant 
differences between countries in terms of levels of economic development, administrative 
capacity and the nature of private finance. There is also an inherent spatial basis in access 
to finance within countries (Martin, 1999). This is true in terms of the capacity of would-
be entrepreneurs to raise their own finance (from family, friends or secured on property), 
bank lending, business angels, and the operation of the venture capital and stock markets. 
Financial systems are characterised by complex institutional geographies that both reflect 
and influence their functioning. This, in turn, produces geographical effects on the ability 
of entrepreneurs to access finance, which typically work to the disadvantage of peripheral 
regional economies. The geography of finance is an important part of this context. This is 
not just because Cohesion Policy seeks to address disparities between countries and 
regions, but also because institutional and administrative capacity, both public and 
private, are typically weaker in less-advantaged regions, which in turn has implications 
for the capacity successfully to implement financial instruments. In the Cohesion Policy 
context, it is also important to note that the scale of funding varies greatly between 
countries and regions: in some countries, notably in central and eastern Europe, the scale 
of Cohesion Policy is of macroeconomic significance and is the principal source of 
economic development funding. In others, especially in northern and western Europe, the 
scale of funding can be relatively marginal to the wider domestic economic development 
policy effort.  
For which policy areas and objectives are publicly backed financial instruments 
suited? 
Theoretical rationales for public intervention 
This paper mainly deals with the practical experiences with financial instruments, the 
companion paper by Brown and Lee focusing on the theoretical dimension. Nevertheless, 
it is worth recalling some issues of principle here since the nature of the justification for 
public intervention has a direct bearing on whether financial instruments are an appropriate 
delivery mechanism for policy.6 
In broad terms, the justification for public intervention in economic development 
policy is to support activities that market operators cannot or will not undertake alone, but 
which are considered in the wider public interest. This is sometimes characterised as 
³market failure´, but in fact can arise in situations where there simply is no market and 
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the private sector is operating quite rationally, or where the market is imperfect and 
operating suboptimally. These include the following (Meiklejohn, 1999): 
x The provision of public goods. These are generally defined as ³non-excludable´ 
and ³non-rivalrous´, meaning that access to the goods concerned cannot be 
limited to those who pay for them and their use by one party does not diminish 
their availability to others. Classic examples of public goods include lighthouses 
and street lighting, but clean air and certain types of public infrastructure such as 
flood defences might also be considered public goods since there is no scope to 
create an efficient market for them. 
x The supply of merit goods, that is, those goods and services which governments 
consider would be consumed at a lower level than desirable if determined solely 
by the free market, and where public authorities should intervene in order to 
ensure uptake at optimal levels. Examples include aspects of education, culture, 
health services, museums and libraries. 
x The presence of externalities, the notion that the activities of an individual or a 
firm have spillovers which affect others and that these are not reflected in market 
prices. In other words, commercial assessments of returns on investment do not 
necessarily capture the wider social or longer term benefits. The conventional 
example of a positive externality is research and development. Firms may be 
deterred from investing in R&D because they cannot reap all the gains from their 
investment (assuming a successful outcome) and there are risks that others will 
³free ride´ on their innovation. This may result in suboptimal levels of investment 
in R&D, and yet the dissemination of new technology has wider societal benefits 
justifying public sector intervention to provide, among other things, the ³patient 
long-term finance´ important for innovation (Mazzucato and Penna, 2015). 
Similarly, firms may be discouraged from bearing the costs of vocational training 
to the extent that it increases the likelihood of staff being ³poached´ by other 
employers who have made no such investment, and yet there are wider benefits to 
society (and individuals) of a better skilled workforce. Urban development is 
another area where there is potential for longer term societal and environmental 
gains, but where the cost and/or risk means that insufficient commercial funding 
can be attracted to deliver on these wider benefits (Nadler and Nadler, 2017). Of 
particular relevance in the present context are energy efficiency and renewable 
energy sources (RES). The market alone is not currently delivering sufficient 
energy from RES to meet agreed climate change targets. RES often requires 
significant upfront capital investment, but in contexts where returns are uncertain, 
partly owing to market and regulatory imperfections and the risks associated with 
different technologies. Energy efficiency may also require significant investment, 
but a number of barriers impede investment at levels needed to achieve energy-
saving targets ± they include cultural barriers among lenders whose mindset is 
more oriented towards growth than cost optimisation, payback times that exceed 
the time that home owners expect to live in the property and split incentives ± for 
example, in the case of rented property where the investment cost is born by the 
landlord but the savings accrue to tenants (Wishlade, Michie and Vernon, 2017). 
x Imperfect information in financial markets. Of course, ³perfect´ information is a 
purely theoretical construct, and risk aversion where insufficient information is 
available is a rational market response by an investor. However, information 
asymmetries can be particularly acute among start-ups which have no track record 
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and new firms in high-technology sectors, where the risks are difficult to assess 
precisely because their activities are innovative. Such firms often lack the 
collateral needed to secure capital or the cost of capital is too high because of 
their risk profile; analysis has suggested that access to finance is likely to be 
especially difficult for certain categories of SME, notably start-ups, small and/or 
young firms, and high-tech enterprises (Siedschlag et al., 2014). This is an 
important policy consideration because there has been increasing policy focus, at 
European, national and subnational levels, on the nurturing of high-growth firms 
(OECD, 2010). This reflects the fact that a very small proportion of new firm starts 
will account for the majority of benefits in terms of investment, employment and 
exports (Henrekson and Johansson, 2010), but significant numbers of ambitious 
new firms cite access to finance as a constraint on their development (Maula, 
Murray and Jääskeläinen, 2007). This focus also partly reflects the role that 
private venture capital is considered to have played in the development of new 
technology firms in certain locations ± like Silicon Valley and Israel ± and in the 
development of some high-profile firms such as Google and Facebook (Gompers 
and Lerner, 2001). Indeed, concern has long been expressed at the relative 
underdevelopment of venture capital markets in European countries (Phillippon 
and Veron, 2008), and at the role of space and place in the availability of capital, 
with capital heavily concentrated in the more prosperous areas. 
In practice, two or more of these situations justifying public intervention may be 
present simultaneously. For example, information asymmetries may mean that 
assessments of very small projects requiring microfinance incur disproportionate 
transaction costs for investors, leading to a dearth of funds for initiatives that could have a 
positive impact on society by reintegrating individuals into the labour market, supporting 
disadvantaged groups and/or reducing welfare dependency. Similarly, investments in 
renewable energy sources could have positive environmental impact, but information 
asymmetries arising from the capacity to assess the risk involved in new technologies can 
mean suboptimal investment.  
Grants vs. financial instruments? 
From a policy design perspective, financial instruments are an alternative delivery 
mechanism to grants. It is important to highlight this since the use of financial 
instruments is often cast in terms of addressing a ³gap´ in access to finance ± typically 
difficulties that SMEs have in accessing loan funding or investment capital. However, 
grants can also be used to address gaps in access to finance and the key issue here lies not 
in the objective of funding per se, but rather in what difference the delivery mechanism 
can make to the achievement of that objective and wider policy effects.  
In practical terms, a role for financial instruments is only feasible where the ultimate 
investment is income-generating or cost-saving, enabling the initial support to be repaid. 
This means that where public intervention is justified by the need for public goods, 
repayable support is unlikely to be well-suited. In other words, appropriate forms of 
finance need to be tailored to the market imperfection being addressed. Three principal 
benefits of financial instruments as opposed to grants are conventionally highlighted 
(European Commission, 2012).  
First, financial instruments are more sustainable because funds are repaid, creating a 
legacy to invest again. For policy makers with long experience of financial instruments, 
this is often regarded as the key benefit, even if it is not always the primary consideration 
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among newer practitioners (Wishlade et al., 2016a). Importantly, however, the scale of 
returns depends not only on the presence of sufficient numbers and scale of viable 
projects that are not commercially funded and the scope for timely exits and repayments, 
but also on the extent to which management costs and fees, defaults and losses erode 
returns. 
Second, financial instruments can improve project quality ± this may be partly through 
the due diligence involved in private sector project assessment, but also because the 
recipient is more focused on project viability because of the obligation to repay. This 
rationale is partly founded on the idea that the level of deadweight involved in financial 
instruments is lower than for grants; there is also a psychological dimension as both investee 
and investor share the risk, though how this is distributed will depend on how the 
instrument is designed. In addition, the use of financial instruments is influenced by the 
view that private sector expertise in assessing business plans improves the viability of 
projects compared to grants. 
Third, and partly related to the sustainability argument, financial instruments can make 
more cost-effective use of public funds partly because funds may be recycled, but also 
because of their potential to attract private funds. This argument was particularly 
significant in the context of the financial crisis, which affected not only public spending, 
but also the willingness of the private sector to lend and invest. That said, there is limited 
evidence of the capacity of public financial instruments to draw in private capital, and 
many ESIF co-funded instruments use public capital alone (Wishlade et al., 2016a). 
Moreover, and as discussed in the seminar, it is important to note that the ESIF aim to 
promote convergence between regions and countries and as such co-financed financial 
instruments are an investment tool and not a countercyclical instrument.  
A secondary benefit related to private capital is the scope for publicly backed 
financial instruments to support the development of local (or sometimes larger) private 
financial markets and there is some evidence of success in this area. For example, in 
Lithuania and in the North-East of England, ERDF co-financed financial instruments for 
enterprises are considered to have had a positive impact on the development of the market 
(Wishlade et al., 2016a), while in Estonia, ERDF co-financing of a renovation loan for 
energy efficiency in housing in 2007-13 has been phased out in 2014-20 on the basis that 
the private market for such funding had developed to the extent that public financing was 
no longer required (Wishlade, Michie and Vernon, 2017). 
The relationship between grants and financial instruments and their respective roles is 
rarely well-articulated in policy ± whether in the domestic arena or in the implementation 
of Cohesion Policy by national and regional authorities. There is a need for the SME 
support offer to be co-ordinated ± financial instruments are not attractive when grants are 
available for similar purposes (Faiña et al., 2012), but as discussed in the seminar, financial 
instruments are considered to play an important role in limiting grant dependency, 
provided that financial instruments and grants are appropriately dovetailed. While this has 
not received much attention in the past, the recent evaluation of financial instruments for 
enterprises in Cohesion Policy in 2007-13 suggests that this is rising up the agenda 
following the wider use of such instruments in 2007-13. Some managing authorities 
perceived financial instruments as improving the capacity of Cohesion Policy to meet 
targets, in comparison with grants (Wishlade et al., 2016b), with a key benefit being that 
financial instruments GLVFRXUDJHJUDQWGHSHQGHQF\SURPRWHDQ³HQWUHSUHQHXULDOFXOWXUH´
and may support (niche) market development. Moreover, they require more corporate 
finance expertise, potentially improving sound decision making among applicants and 
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policy makers (Regeneris Consulting and Old Bell 3, 2014). That said, grants are 
generally considered easier to administer by policy makers, though there is not 
necessarily a substantial difference between the two for recipients and some policy 
makers note that good-quality applicants may prefer loans because a larger proportion of 
their cost can be covered (Wishlade et al., 2016a). Moreover, as discussed in the seminar, 
financial instruments are not universally considered more complex by managing 
authorities, with one participant noting that they can, in fact, be simpler than grants at the 
audit stage, provided that procurement processes are compliant. The scope to combine 
different forms of support has been given limited consideration in Cohesion Policy, but 
blending loans and grants has become common practice in international development 
finance (Bilal and Krätke, 2013). This involves the combination of grant aid from official 
development assistance with other public or private sources of finance such as loans and 
risk capital. This approach is perceived to offer a number of advantages, in particular: 
x the scope to do ³more with less´, as already mentioned 
x the possibility to ensure the uptake of international political and technical standards 
x the ability to enhance ³ownership´ through close involvement in the design and 
implementation of the funding 
x the capacity to open up and provide incentives for entry into new or otherwise too 
risky markets for the private sector, and lever in private funds. 
Potential downsides are also identified, including: 
x the risk that financial incentives outweigh development objectives 
x the possibility that finance becomes too concentrated on certain sectors if funding 
follows ³market-led´ trends 
x ill-defined monitoring and evaluation  
x inefficiencies in the way in which private investment is incentivised. 
As discussed later, financial instruments should not be viewed in isolation, or purely 
as part of a funding package; instead, a holistic approach that combines advice and other 
support, whether training, consultancy, energy audits, etc. is needed to optimise 
intervention. 
It is important to note that financial instruments are not suitable for all types of 
intervention. As outlined earlier, the justifications for intervening vary and these in turn 
affect the choice of delivery mode (whether non-repayable or financial instruments). In 
practice, however, the academic and policy literature reveals little research on the relative 
merits of grants versus financial instruments in different situations. A recent ³think piece´ 
posited that there should be a presumption in favour of using financial instruments in 
supporting SMEs, but that grants might be appropriate in four scenarios (Regeneris 
Consulting and Old Bell 3, 2014): 
x For early-stage research and development (where there is an established precedent 
for the provision of grants to new ventures to support proof of concept and 
provide seed funding, and grants may be appropriate for early rounds of funding 
for young, small technology-based SMEs). 
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x To encourage change in behaviour, such as investment in energy-saving measures 
(using a grant to incentivise behaviour change to tackle an important market 
failure and to deliver public goods). 
x At key points in their development, for social enterprises and charities (some of 
which will never be traded on markets or be financially self-sustaining). 
x Addressing a viability gap to enable a project to proceed (where own 
contributions and commercial sources are insufficient but additionality and value-
for-money criteria are met). In these circumstances there may be a case for a grant 
to fill the viability gap and enable the project to go ahead, if additionality and 
value-for-money criteria are met.  
How were financial instruments used under Cohesion Policy in 2007-13?  
As already mentioned, the emphasis on the use of financial instruments in Cohesion 
Policy has been reinforced for 2014-20, with the Commission promoting both high levels 
of financial commitment to financial instruments, and the use of financial instruments 
potentially across all policy areas. In looking at 2007-13, the following ³headline´ figures 
emerge, based on the situation at the end of 2015 (Wishlade and Michie, 2016):  
x Twenty-five member states had established co-financed financial instruments 
in 2007-15 (Croatia, Ireland and Luxembourg had not) involving support from 
188 operational programmes. 
x EUR 17.9 billion in operational programme contributions had been committed to 
financial instruments, of which EUR 16.9 billion had been paid into holding funds 
or specific funds and EUR 12.7 billion had reached final recipients ± an overall 
³absorption rate´ of 75% of operational programme contributions. 
x Seventy-seven holding funds and 975 ³specific´ funds (i.e. loan, guarantee, equity 
or other funds) had been set up; of the specific funds, 513 were established within 
holding funds and 462 were implemented directly. 
x The average holding fund size was just over EUR 100 million; 25 holding funds 
were larger than EUR 100 million and the largest (in Hungary) has received 
allocations of EUR 873 million. In contrast, five holding funds were below 
EUR 15 million, with the smallest being just over EUR 7 million (in Poland). 
x Specific funds had an average size of just over EUR 20 million, but ranged from 
over EUR 100 million (15 financial instruments) to under EUR 1 million 
(86 financial instruments ± of which 53 were in France). 
x Most of the funds (887 specific funds) provided support to enterprises ± and all 
member states using financial instruments supported enterprises; 11 member 
states financed urban development through a total 51 specific funds; and 
10 member states supported energy efficiency through 27 specific funds. 
x Of the total dispersed by the end of 2015, some 45% was in the form of loans to 
enterprises (Figure 1). 
There were significant differences in scale and absorption rates between the different 
policy areas targeted, as indicated in Table 1. However, in all cases, there was an 
improvement in the rate of absorption between the end of 2014 and 2015 (European 
Commission, 2016).  
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Figure 1. Amounts dispersed to final recipients and share of total by end 2015 
Million EUR 
 
Source: Own calculations from European Commission (2016).  
Table 1. ³Absorption´ of funds through financing instruments 
Million EUR as at end December 2015 
 Operational programme 
contributions paid to 
holding funds or specific 
funds 
Operational programme 
contributions paid to 
final recipients 
Operational programme 
contributions remaining in 
holding funds or specific 
funds 
³Absorption´UDWH  
Enterprises 14 543 11 181 3 292 76.9% 
Urban development 1 658 1 138 275 68.6% 
Energy efficiency 703 355 291 50.5% 
Note: The operational programme contributions here include both EU funds and domestic co-financing.  
Source: European Commission (2016). 
There were also wide variations between member states, both in their use of financial 
instruments and in the levels of absorption:  
x Italy alone accounted for over 29% of operational programme contributions 
paid to financial instruments (almost EUR 5 billion) by the end of 2015; however, 
only 53% of this was actually invested in final recipients.  
x Other large member states had also made significant payments to financial 
instruments by the end of 2015, including Germany (EUR 1.7 billion) and the 
United Kingdom (EUR 1.6 billion), but payments were not directly related to 
country size, with Poland and Spain also each paying over EUR 1.2 billion to 
funds, but France just EUR 461 million.  
x By the end of 2015, 90 financial instruments had either not yet made any 
investments in final recipients or had not reported them. Of these, 56 were in 
France and 17 in Italy.   
x In nine countries, over 90% of monies paid to financial instruments had been 
paid to final recipients ± Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
Enterprises - loans; 
5 666; 45%
Enterprises - guarantees; 
2 962; 23%
Enterprises - equity; 
2 372; 19%
Enterprises - other; 181; 
2%
Urban - loans; 
1 101; 9%
Urban - equity; 38; 0%
Energy - loans; 294; 2%
Energy - equity; 14; 0%
Energy - other; 47; 0%
Autre; 
1 675; 13%Other; 
1 675; 13% 
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Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Portugal; the lowest absorption rates were found 
in the Slovak Republic and Spain (37%) and Italy (53%). The large scale of sums 
paid to financial instruments in Italy and Spain (EUR 6.2 billion and over 36% of 
all payments to financial instruments), coupled with these low levels of 
investment in final recipients, meant that over 73% of the amounts remaining in 
holding funds or specific funds were accounted for by these two countries.  
In the reporting for 2007-13, there is limited information on measures of performance. 
For example, little is known about leverage: the data suggest that private co-financing at 
the level of the operational programmes only plays a significant role in Austria, Latvia, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom; however, private sector contributions are not 
limited to this level, so these data may underplay private sector involvement. Other 
important indicators were not collected, or not collected systematically for 2007-13 
because their reporting was not mandatory. This includes data on defaults and repayments, 
management costs and fees, as well as broader indicators of the wider impacts, such as 
investment or jobs associated.  
In 2007-13, the vast majority of financial instruments under Cohesion Policy were 
ERDF co-financed, and used for supporting enterprise development, especially SMEs, 
notably in the form of loans (Figure 2). A total of 11 countries used financial instruments 
for urban development; and 11 used them for energy efficiency and renewables.  
Overview of plans in 2014-20 
Turning to how financial instruments are being used in the 2014-20 planning period, 
data on plans to use them in the operational programmes reveal that overall member 
states plan to almost double their spend on financial instruments in 2014-20, to over 
EUR 20 billion from ESIF resources, compared to around EUR 12 billion committed to 
financial instruments in 2007-13.  
Figure 2. Operational programme contributions to financial instruments, selected EU countries 
EU funds only, million EUR 
 
Source: $XWKRUV¶ FDOFXODWLRQV IURP (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ (2016); and OP data available at: 
https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu. 
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Plans vary widely between countries, as Figure 3 shows:  
x Nineteen countries plan to increase allocations to financial instruments in absolute 
terms. In some cases these increases are substantial ± in the Czech Republic, the 
Netherlands, Poland and Portugal, for example, financial instrument allocations 
for 2014-20 are more than three times those for 2007-13. 
x Several member states plan lower contributions to financial instruments in 2014-20 
than in the previous period (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece and 
Italy) with significant reductions foreseen in Italy. As in 2007-13, Ireland and 
Luxembourg do not currently plan to use financial instruments.  
Figure 3. Operational programme commitments in selected EU countries to financial instruments, 2007-13 
and 2014-20  
As a percentage of operational programme commitments 
 
Source: $XWKRUV¶ FDOFXODWLRQV IURP (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ (2016); and OP data available at: 
https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu. 
At the EU level, calculations based on the summary report (European Commission, 
2016) suggest that about 4% of operational programme contributions were committed to 
financial instruments in 2007-13; for 2014-20, the operational programme data indicate 
that this is planned to rise to over 6% for 2014-20. However, the share earmarked for 
financial instruments also varies widely between countries, as indicated in Figure 3: 
x seven countries intend to commit more than 8% of operational programme 
contributions in the form of financial instruments (Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and the United Kingdom)  
x Italy, Belgium and Denmark committed the largest shares of operational programme 
contributions to financial instruments in 2007-13, but planned amounts are 
considerably reduced in 2014-20  
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A total of fourteen operational programmes have planned financial instrument spend 
exceeding EUR 400 million;7 collectively these programmes alone account for over 55% 
of planned financial instrument spend across the EU-28. At the opposite end of the 
spectrum, some fifty programmes plan to allocate around EUR 20 million or less to 
financial instruments (though this may account for a large share of spend in operational 
programmes with small budgets).  
These data provide an interesting snapshot of intent, but must be treated with caution, 
as managing authorities have dealt differently with the obligation to ³set down a marker´ 
for financial instruments in their operational programmes: some provided an indicative 
amount, others recorded ³zero´ against financial instruments as form of finance or left the 
entry blank, though the narrative of the operational programme left the possibility of 
using such tools in the future open. Plans for using financial instruments will also be 
affected by the outcomes of the now mandatory ex ante assessments, which can increase 
or decrease financial allocations or alter their thematic profile. Changes to the operational 
programme plans for financial instruments may also occur if economic conditions 
change, or local domestic priorities shift. Decisions to contribute to joint and EU-level 
instruments such as the SME Initiative are not reflected in these data, but so far, six 
member states are implementing the SME Initiative (Bulgaria, Finland, Italy, Malta, 
Romania and Spain). Under this approach an entire OP allocation is in the form of a 
financial instrument and a separate operational programme document must be prepared 
for the member state¶V contribution to the SME Initiative. 
As already mentioned, a feature of the reforms was extension of financial instruments 
beyond enterprises, urban development and energy efficiency to embrace all of the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶V WKHPDWLF REMHFWLYHV 7KH LQIRUPDWLRQ DYDLODEOH LQ WKH operational 
programmes is indicative, but as Figure 4 shows, early indications are that SME support 
is likely to continue to dominate the use of financial instruments. That said, financial 
instruments for low carbon are also significant.  
Figure 4. Operational programme indicative allocations to financial instruments by thematic objective  
 
Source: $XWKRUV¶FDOFXODWLRQVIURP23GDWDDYDLODEOHDWhttps://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu. 
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A number of financial instruments are set within operational programme priority axes 
which address multiple thematic objectives (Multi TO in Figure 4), making it difficult to 
determine how financial instruments will be targeted until they are closer to the 
implementation stage. However, it seems that most will either address TO1 and TO3, 
focusing on innovation and SMEs; or TO3, TO4 and TO9, focusing on urban 
development, including support for start-ups and disadvantaged groups in regeneration 
areas. The precise composition cannot be known at this stage of implementation. 
The potential for financial instruments in different areas of activity 
One of the research questions posed for this paper concerns the potential for financial 
instruments and activities that could benefit from their use. This is not a straightforward 
question to address. However, Table 2 summarises the main policy areas relevant to 
DG REGIO where financial instruments are used domestically and/or with co-financing 
from the ESI funds. 
The key point to emerge from this is the high degree of granularity involved. This applies 
to the more specific goals relevant to each theme and to the categories of final recipient. 
For example, within the broad goal of encouraging SME growth, different approaches would 
be relevant to firms that had been identified as potential high-growth SMEs, compared 
with those interested in undertaking routine investment but not on an expansion 
trajectory. These different requirements translate not only into needs for different financial 
products, but also to different forms of governance, with some financial products involving 
bespoke risk assessment and project appraisal (especially equity-based products), while 
others, such as guarantees, and potentially, energy efficiency loans for householders, can be 
deployed on a relatively standardised basis through the retail banking sector.  
Table 2 also provides examples of domestic and co-financed instruments relevant to 
the various policy objectives ± more information on these is provided in Annex A. 
Importantly, however, even where measures seemingly address the same goals and same 
target recipients, the approach taken may vary widely. 
What are the key preconditions for the implementation of financial instruments? 
Framework conditions relevant to the implementation of financial instruments include 
the existing financial ecosystem/economic context, institutional capacity, the regulatory 
framework and a range of more operational issues. In considering these contextual issues 
in the discussion that follows, the main focus is on support for SMEs, where there is most 
experience in the use of financial instruments across EU member states, but these factors 
are also relevant to the use of financial instruments in other policy areas, together with 
more specific elements.  
The context within which financial instruments are implemented will affect how and 
how well they work. Circumstances vary between member states and regions, so there is 
no ³one-size-fits-all´ approach (Wishlade et al., 2016a). Financial instrument models are 
seldom transferable without modification to take local, regional or national conditions 
into account. These include differences in local economic conditions, in banking and legal 
systems, previous experience with implementing financial instruments, etc. The financial 
intrument model must be shaped by local circumstances and needs. Various academic 
studies have emphasised the need for instruments to be tailored to different areas (Veugelers, 
2011; Tykvová, Borell and Kroencke, 2012; Berggren and Silver, 2012). In short, financial 
instrument design must be alert to context and take it into consideration (Wilson and 
Silva, 2013). 
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Table 2. Linking objectives, market imperfections, target recipients and financial products 
Theme Goal Target recipient 
Market imperfection/ 
finance gap 
Financial products 
Standardisation/ 
specialisation 
Examples 
In
no
va
tio
n 
Development and 
commercialisation of new 
products, processes, 
services 
High tech firms;  
spin-out companies 
Asymmetric information; 
difficulty of risk assessment; 
scale of capital required in 
relation to cash flow; 
externalities 
Equity: seed, start-up 
or early-stage capital; 
loans; guarantees 
Small numbers of 
specialised investment 
decisions involving fund 
manager expertise; 
potentially large 
investments 
France: Breizh up (ERDF) 
Spain: ICO Technological Innovation Fund (ERDF) 
S
M
E
 c
om
pe
tit
iv
en
es
s 
Promoting 
entrepreneurship 
Start-ups/individuals Lack of collateral, track 
record; transaction costs; 
credit rationing 
Loans, guarantees, 
microfinance 
Potentially large numbers 
of  investment decisions 
involving small sums; 
standard products 
Germany: NRW Micro Loan Fund (ERDF) 
Hungary: Combined Microcredit scheme (ERDF) 
United Kingdom: Start-up loans (Nat) 
Supporting SME growth High-growth firms Difficulty of risk assessment; 
credit rationing 
Loans, guarantees, 
equity; mezzanine 
finance 
Bespoke decisions  France: JEREMIE Languedoc-Roussillon (ERDF) 
Sweden: Regional venture capital funds (ERDF) 
United Kingdom: Scottish Co-Investment Fund 
(ERDF) 
Supporting SME growth Mainstream SMEs Credit rationing; asymmetric 
information 
Loans, guarantees Standardised products Austria: ERP loan fund (Nat) 
France: JEREMIE Languedoc-Roussillon (ERDF) 
Lithuania: INVEGA Guarantee Fund (ERDF) 
Portugal: Venture capital funds under the OP 
COMPETE (ERDF) 
Spain: ICO Guarantee Fund (ERDF) 
United Kingdom: Enterprise Guarantee Fund (Nat) 
Lo
w
-c
ar
bo
n 
ec
on
om
y 
Promoting energy 
efficiency and renewable 
energy sources in 
enterprises 
SMEs Credit rationing; asymmetric 
information; externalities 
Loans, guarantees Standardised products, 
supported by energy audits 
Germany: KfW Energy efficiency programme (Nat) 
United Kingdom: Green Deal (Nat) 
Energy efficient buildings Householders Transaction costs; cost of 
credit; externalities 
Long-term loans, 
guarantees 
Standardised products, 
supported by energy audits 
Estonia: Renovation loan (ERDF) 
Greece: JESSICA (ERDF) 
United Kingdom: Green Deal (Nat) 
Private landlords Split incentives; externalities Long-term loans Standardised products, 
supported by energy audits 
Estonia: Renovation Loan (ERDF)  
Slovak Republic: JESSICA (ERDF) 
Public authorities Split incentives; cost of credit; 
externalities 
Long-term loans Bespoke decisions  Lithuania: ENEF (ERDF) 
Housing associations Split incentives; cost of credit; 
externalities 
Long-term loans Standardised products, 
supported by energy audits 
Estonia: Renovation Loan (ERDF) 
Slovak Republic: JESSICA (ERDF) 
Energy efficient public 
infrastructure, 
e.g. transport, street 
lighting 
Public authorities Cost of credit; positive 
externalities 
Long-term loans Bespoke investment 
decisions 
Spain: FIDAE (ERDF) 
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Table 2. Linking objectives, market imperfections, target recipients and financial products (continued) 
Theme Goal Target recipient 
Market imperfection/ 
finance gap 
Financial products 
Standardisation/ 
specialisation 
Examples 
Lo
w
-c
ar
bo
n 
ec
on
om
y 
(c
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
) 
Renewables infrastructure Enterprises Risk; externalities Loans, guarantees, 
equity 
Bespoke decisions ± 
specific to technology 
involved 
Germany: KfW Renewables energy programme 
(Nat) 
Spain: FIDAE (ERDF) 
Development and 
commercialisation of new 
energy efficiency and 
renewable energy source 
technologies 
High-tech firms,  
spin-out companies 
Asymmetric information; 
difficulty of risk assessment; 
externalities 
Equity: seed, start-up 
or early-stage capital 
Bespoke decisions 
involving specialised fund 
management 
Sweden: Green Fund (ERDF) 
United Kingdom: Low carbon innovation fund 
(ERDF)  
T
ra
ns
po
rt
 a
nd
 
ne
tw
or
k 
in
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 Development of low-carbon 
transport systems 
Public authorities Cost of credit; externalities Long-term loans Bespoke decisions 
involving specialised fund 
management 
Spain: FIDAE (ERDF) 
Improving energy efficiency 
and security of supply 
Energy suppliers/ 
distributors 
Externalities; credit rationing Long-term loans and 
financing packages 
Bespoke decisions 
involving specialised fund 
management 
Germany: KfW syndicated loan for energy and 
environment (Nat) 
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t Supporting  
self-employment,  
micro-enterprises 
Individuals, especially 
in disadvantaged 
groups ± unemployed, 
women, minorities  
Lack of collateral, track 
record; transaction costs; 
credit rationing 
Loans, guarantees, 
microfinance 
Potentially large numbers 
of  investment decisions 
involving small sums; 
standard products 
Belgium: BRUSOC (ERDF) 
S
oc
ia
l i
nc
lu
si
on
 Regenerating deprived 
communities in urban 
areas 
Public authorities, 
public-private 
partnerships property 
developers, firms 
Externalities; risk Loans, guarantees, 
equity 
Bespoke decisions 
involving specialised fund 
management 
France: Bpi ± Prêt entreprises et quartiers (Nat) 
Supporting social 
enterprise 
New and existing 
social enterprises 
Risk; lack of collateral;  
credit rationing 
Loans, guarantees, 
microfinance 
Standardised 
decision making  
and products 
France: Bpi ± Prêt économie sociale et solidaire 
(Nat) 
E
du
ca
tio
n 
an
d 
tr
ai
ni
ng
 
  Individuals Lack of collateral; risk; 
externalities 
Loans, guarantees Standardised products DE: Aufstiegs-BAfoG loans (Nat) 
UK: Career development loans (Nat) 
Source: $XWKRU¶VHODERUDWLRQ. 
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As part of this, it is fundamental that financial instrument implementation builds on 
an accurate assessment of the market situation, which provides clear evidence of the need 
for public intervention. Because market conditions are so diverse, research on market 
gaps and economic structures is key to accurate instrument design and the allocation of 
funds (Cowling, 2012). Managing authorities implementing financial instruments 
in 2007-13 identified three main shortcomings to the approaches taken to market 
assessment at the start of that period.8 These were: insufficient involvement of local 
actors; inadequate analyses of the market situation leading to under- or over-allocation of 
funds to financial instruments, or inappropriately targeted instruments because the 
analyses were not detailed or comprehensive enough to provide a basis for policy; and 
failure to anticipate economic change (Michie, Wishlade and Gloazzo, 2014). Several key 
lessons emerged from this experience, which implied the following specific needs to 
support the implementation of financial instruments: 
x a thorough understanding of the locality in order to take account of the specific 
characteristics of a region and the impact of this context on market failures and 
potential 
x specialist analysis of the SME financing market to improve the reliability of the 
overall assessment 
x involvement of public and private stakeholders to facilitate the market analysis 
and help to ensure a balanced perspective on the market situation 
x assessment of the administrative and technical capacity of the stakeholders within 
that particular territory to set up and run appropriate instruments 
x the development of an investment strategy based on an in-depth analysis that 
takes account of strategic objectives, funding sources (including proportion of 
private co-funding), options for fund structure and management, financial and 
legal aspects 
x a forward-looking element to take account of changing economic conditions and 
the funding needs of firms 
x a regular review to check economic circumstances and market needs.  
Many of these conditions are now mandatory elements of the ex ante assessment 
process required before ESIF are committed to financial instruments.  
More generally, market conditions must be favourable for the implementation of 
financial instruments ± there must be sufficient ³density´ in terms of numbers of suitable 
projects/final recipients/investee companies, as well as potential co-investors, and 
appropriate financial intermediaries, whether these are banks or fund managers. The lack 
of a functioning ecosystem of project promoters/investors, or the lack of stakeholders 
with the required expertise, may lead to an uneven dissemination of instruments, such as 
urban development funds under the Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in 
City Areas (JESSICA) initiatives (Nadler and Nadler, 2017). On the other hand, financial 
instruments can be used to build up the market, e.g. by encouraging co-investors, business 
angels or fund managers to invest in and perhaps move or relocate to an area. For 
example, the Scottish Co-Investment Fund has been found to have grown both capacity 
and capability in the market; it has had an observable effect on the development of the 
financial community, especially angel syndicates, and the encouragement of new lenders 
to enter the Scottish market (CSES, 2008). The presence of an appropriate ³ecosystem´ of 
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firms and investors to generate a critical mass of activity is less likely in disadvantaged 
regions ± highlighting the need to address other dimensions of the business environment 
to ensure an adequate flow of investor-ready projects, including training, pre- and post-
investment advice, and perhaps non-repayable support to complement the financial 
instrument.  
Stability and predictability are also key contextual factors. Financial instruments 
require a long-term perspective and predictability to work well; irregular public sector 
interventions, uncertainty as to whether ongoing interventions will be continued, changes 
in terms and conditions, etc. affect both the willingness of the private sector to invest and 
the ability to build up competence and capacity (growth analysis, 2016). 
The implementation of financial instruments requires considerable institutional and 
administrative capacity. This is not unique to financial instruments and also applies to 
grants, but some aspects of financial instrument implementation may be more demanding. 
For example, while the state aid rules are relatively straightforward in relation to grants, 
they are much more complex for financial instruments, for which there must be an 
assessment of the presence of state aid at several levels ± not just the final recipient but 
also financial intermediaries. Urban development plans implemented through JESSICA 
proved particularly challenging from a state aid point of view, but also required an 
understanding of the complex and sometimes conflicting motivations of parties involved 
in urban regeneration, including an understanding of property markets and the impact of 
issues such as pollution on investment decisions. More generally, the increased use of 
financial instruments under Cohesion Policy in 2007-13 created significant challenges for 
managing authorities with limited experience in implementing financial instruments, and 
it was demanding in terms of the administrative capacity required at national and regional 
levels (Wishlade et al., 2017a). The extension of financial instruments to all ESIF 
thematic objectives in 2014-20 means that managing authorities may have to engage with 
different stakeholders, and involves considerations for the use of financial instruments 
which are quite distinct from those for SME support. For example, experts may be 
required to play a role in conducting energy audits or assessments and projects may be 
very technical, so applications take longer to prepare and specific expertise is required 
(Vironen, 2016). In some cases, the chain of responsibility is lengthy and involves relying 
on expertise that is somewhat removed from those responsible for the funds and risks 
conflicts of interest. Where specialist input is required, this must be credible. For 
example, for the UK Green Deal scheme (a domestic programme), accredited assessors 
determined the scope and financing needs for energy efficiency investments in 
households, but some 10% of certified assessors were struck off for non-compliance with 
the Green Deal code, undermining public confidence in the scheme (Chandler, 2015). 
This was one of the factors underpinning low take-up and the ultimate demise of the 
scheme. 
The creation of successful financial instruments is an iterative process, involving trial 
and error, so implementation that builds on previous experience/existing structures can 
gain an important advantage. In Nordrhein-Westfalen (Germany), for example, when 
co-financing financial instruments under the ERDF OP in 2007-13, it was considered to 
make more sense to draw on the existing expertise and structures within the NRW Land-
owned public investment bank, NRW.BANK, rather than setting up a parallel 
institutional framework. It was also hoped that the use of the Land investment bank 
would ensure that the fund was fully neutral and would not favour any particular lending 
institutions. The perceived advantages of the Land investment bank are that it is very 
familiar with the financial situation and difficulties of local firms and that it is used to 
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working closely and constructively with the different Land ministries and playing a 
bridging role between the Land government, commercial/co-operative banks and local 
SMEs (Michie and Wishlade, 2011).  
The regulatory framework within which financial instruments are implemented has a 
crucial role to play in providing the framework conditions for the successful implementation 
of financial instruments. The ability of the public sector to intervene in markets through 
the introduction of financial instruments must be rooted in legislation, the nature of which 
(complex, slow to change, stringently monitored, and subject to a heavy reporting and audit 
burden) may conflict with private sector/commercial practices. The regulatory framework 
under which ESIF financial instruments are implemented has changed significantly over 
successive programming periods ± from essentially being implemented under legislation 
designed for grants to a more detailed framework within the main regulations along with 
numerous associated delegated acts and implementing regulations. As a result, the 
regulatory framework for ESIF financial instruments in 2014-20 now provides more 
clarity and certainty, but also considerable complexity. However, the regulatory framework 
has consolidated lessons learnt during previous periods, and, through the regulations, the 
Commission has encouraged the use of financial instruments by introducing changes such as:  
x increasing the implementation options available (e.g. providing options for 
contributing to EU-level financial instruments, or using ³Rff-the-shelf´ template 
financial instruments which are pre-cleared for state aid) 
x increasing certainty by incorporating into the legislation detail which had previously 
been provided in guidance 
x ensuring accurate assessment of the market before ESIF are committed to financial 
instruments by introducing a mandatory ex ante assessment process. 
At a policy level, European Commissioners responsible for ESIF have encouraged the 
use of financial instruments by suggesting that member states meet spending targets 
linked to the thematic objectives; however, it may be difficult to reconcile minimum 
targets or ring-fencing with the findings of an ex ante assessment, which is now intended 
to underpin the design, scale and governance of co-financed financial instruments.  
Despite these improvements, managing authorities still find some aspects of the 
regulatory framework to be barriers to the use of financial instruments, including the 
administrative burden, the restrictions imposed by the seven-year programming period (in 
reality, it is much shorter than this given the protracted set-up time for financial 
instruments), and the restrictions on management costs and fees. These constraints are not 
limited to ESIF financial instruments ± for example, an internal evaluation of the Canada 
Small Business Program in 2014 found that the demands placed by the programme¶V
regulatory and legislative framework, coupled with the slow pace of change to the 
framework, was placing its relationships with private sector stakeholders under stress, and 
KDG GLPLQLVKHG WKH SURJUDPPH¶V DSSHDO IRU OHQGHUV (Box 1). That said, many consider 
that the administrative burden is primarily carried by financial intermediaries and managing 
authorities, with limited impact on final recipients.  
On a more operational level, there are various framework pre-conditions that facilitate 
the success of financial instrument implementation, including management of the 
relationship with the private sector, rigorous monitoring including of returned funds, 
effective publicity activity to communicate the existence of the financial instrument, and 
complementary policy activities such as advice, consultancy support, technical assistance 
and complementary grants.  
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Box 1. Canada Small Business Financing Program 
The Canada Small Business Financing Program supports start-ups and existing businesses 
by providing guarantees on loans of up to CAD 500 000 offered through commercial banks. The 
Canada Small Business Financing Program covers 85% of eligible losses on defaulted loans 
registered under the programme. The borrower is charged an upfront fee of 2% of the loan value 
(which can be rolled into the loan) and a yearly fee of 1.25% of the loan value paid through the 
interest rate and remitted to the Canada Small Business Financing Program. The interest rate is 
variable and set by the lender, but under the programme is capped at 3 percentage points above 
WKHILQDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQ¶VSULPHOHQGLQJUDWH 
Relationship management with the private sector includes ensuring the alignment of 
incentives and effective control procedures. One of the major attractions of the use of 
financial instruments is their ability to mobilise private sector resources and expertise. 
Building effective links with the private sector may require incentives such as the 
introduction of yield restriction or loss mitigation clauses (as in the ERDF-funded New 
Hungary Venture Capital Programme in 2007-13) or asymmetric models for the 
distribution of profit (as in the IN2:BA ± Business Angels Co-investment scheme funded 
under the Portugal COMPETE OP in 2007-13) (Michie, Wishlade and Gloazzo, 2014). 
Careful consideration must be given to the design of such incentives in order to ensure 
adequate alignment of public policy objectives with private sector motives for involvement.  
As well as incentives, there must be controls put in place to guard against objective 
drift. An evaluation of ERDF-funded venture capital and loan funds carried out for the 
Commission in 2007 pointed out that the extent of public or private involvement in 
venture capital and loan funds can have implications for risk management and the relative 
emphasis on regional development objectives versus purely financial objectives (CSES, 
2007). Evidence from the evaluation suggested that public sector involvement leads to a 
greater focus on purely regional development objectives. Also, because the public sector 
shareholders perceive the impact on regional development as one of the most important 
aims of the interventions, they are often willing to assume greater risks and accept lower 
financial returns. This can increase deal flow and widen the impact on jobs. In contrast, 
private shareholders are likely to be more concerned with financial returns and see 
regional development impacts more in terms of the ³demonstration effect´ arising from a 
professionally managed venture capital operation. Interestingly, this may not be easy to 
predict ± a 2016 evaluation of the ERDF co-financed Swedish regional venture capital 
funds found notable differences between the regional funds in their ethos ± some 
identified themselves as regional development players while others perceived themselves 
as traditional venture capitalists (growth analysis, 2016).  
The investment strategies, which form part of the funding agreement drawn up between 
the ESIF managing authorities and the entities selected to manage funds, along with 
contractual arrangements and management incentives, help ensure that operational 
programme objectives are not sidelined in the pursuit of other potentially complementary, but 
sometimes competing, goals (e.g. profit). Monitoring and evaluation have an important 
role to play in maintaining a close link between policy objectives and outcomes (Wilson 
and Silva, 2013; NEA2F, 2013). Nevertheless, this is not straightforward to manage and 
anecdotal evidence suggests that changing economic circumstances ± like the financial 
crisis ± can lead fund managers to interpret investment strategies in ways that were not 
necessarily anticipated in areas like property development.  
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As mentioned above, one of the main perceived benefits of using financial 
instruments in place of grants is their repayable nature and the possibility of reusing 
resources, and potentially creating a ³legacy´ or ³evergreen´ fund. Managing authorities 
must set up processes to deal with (and report) returns from financial instruments. In 
2007-13, there was little evidence of explicit planning for this, and reporting of returns 
has generally been poor (Wishlade et al., 2016b). 
Regular monitoring of financial instrument performance, and also of the market more 
widely, has an important role to play in providing feedback on performance, perhaps even 
more so than for grants. In 2007-13, most managing authorities had to deviate from their 
initial financial instrument implementation plans due to changing circumstances 
(Van Ginkel et al., 2013). One example of a regular market review is the Scottish Market 
Report, which is carried out annually by Scottish Enterprise, manager of the Scottish 
Co-Investment Fund. The fund manager considers that the development of a method and 
approach designed to provide accurate data on the market has been key to the success of 
its policy interventions in the early-stage risk capital market.9 The Market Report sets out 
the structure, conduct and performance of the early-stage risk capital market, and it can 
be used to assess the impact of financial instruments at industry level, and therefore 
whether the instruments are doing what they were intended to do at macroeconomic level. 
While fund evaluations provide information about what is happening at the level of the 
fund, the Market Report provides information on what is happening at the level of the 
economy, and builds up a store of longitudinal data. Similarly, Investitionsbank Berlin 
works in partnership with a local credit research company which conducts interviews 
with 1 000 SMEs in Berlin each year. These interviews assess the ease of access to debt 
finance and the extent to which companies use public finance. The results of this survey 
are then used to evaluate, improve or adjust financial instruments (Michie, Wishlade and 
Gloazzo, 2014).  
Box 2. Scottish Co-Investment Fund 
The Scottish Co-Investment Fund is designed to increase private sector investment in 
early-stage enterprise development as a result of the private sector sharing the investment risk. 
The national development agency, Scottish Enterprise, identifies investment propositions and 
recruits private sector investors to co-invest alongside the public sector on a pari passu basis, up 
to a maximum of GBP 1 million (total deal value of up to GBP 2 million). The role of the private 
sector investors is to undertake all due diligence and that of the public sector to follow its lead, 
so long as investments meet certain criteria. The administrative burden is born by the investors 
rather than the businesses. The Scottish Co-Investment Fund has received ERDF funding in 
three successive programming periods: 2000-06, 2007-13 and 2014-20.   
Linked to the monitoring of financial instrument performance and the needs of the 
market, flexibility must be built into the system to reflect changing needs or circumstances or 
to deal with unintended outcomes. Feedback loops resulting from monitoring and 
evaluation and from revisiting the finance gap are an important component of the capacity 
to adapt to changing requirements and conditions. The implementation structures chosen 
must ensure that flexibility is possible. In terms of flexibility in implementation structures, 
holding funds/fund of funds models can provide the ability to move resources between 
funds depending on demand, although they bring an additional tier of costs (Michie, Wishlade 
and Gloazzo, 2014). Related to the need to adapt to the changing environment, and the 
potentially changing needs of recipients, the financial instrument investment strategy should 
also be modified in line with the updating of the ex ante assessment.  
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Alongside regular monitoring, evaluation has an important role to play in the 
successful implementation of financial instruments. Relevant evaluative material is sparse, 
partly due to the time lag in being able to measure the impact of financial instruments 
(growth analysis, 2016). Evaluation plans should be drawn up at the outset as part of the 
management of financial instruments, to ensure that the effective use of public funds can 
be accounted for, and also to help with the management and targeting of the funds on an 
ongoing basis. Evaluation can also provide guidance on future needs and funding 
strategies (Michie, Wishlade and Gloazzo, 2014).  
Communication and publicity measures are crucial to raise awareness, help generate 
deal flow and publicise the (new) policy approach. Communication activities on financial 
instruments were not given very high priority in 2007-13 and there was some tension 
noted between Structural Funds publicity obligations and the confidentiality requirements 
of final recipients. Activities such as seminars and networking were found to be the most 
effective publicity methods and some managing authorities have made successful use of 
innovative techniques such as campaigns on social media and more widely (Michie, 
Wishlade and Gloazzo, 2014). For example, the INVEGA Guarantee Fund and 
Entrepreneurship Promotion Funds in Lithuania used a range of complementary measures, 
including information and project visit trips for journalists; annual events; press releases; 
press conferences; radio and TV programmes; items on major news portals; participation 
in events and fairs; communication in social media; joint activities with government; 
social, economic and media partners; and websites. One of the most innovative and 
successful activities was a media campaign launched in 2013 illustrating 13 business 
success stories on the largest Lithuanian Internet news portal. The campaign included 
radio shows and TV reports about business success stories, and how EU support and 
different financial instruments had helped them start and expand their businesses (Michie, 
Wishlade and Gloazzo, 2014). 
The existence of complementary support can be crucial for the implementation of 
financial instruments ± from networking activity to promote business angels/angel 
networks and to introduce supply and demand sides to programmes for improving the 
investment readiness of companies, improving knowledge of financing instruments or 
GHYHORSLQJ FRPSDQLHV¶ DELOLW\ WR SUHVHQW Wheir business plans (growth analysis, 2016). 
Seminars, events and networking can be effective for improving deal flow, in particular 
for equity instruments. The 2016 evaluation of the Swedish regional venture capital funds 
identified a need for supplementary policy instruments, such as training programmes for 
LQYHVWRUVDQGLQLWLDWLYHVDLPHGDWLQFUHDVLQJFRPSDQLHV¶LQYHVWLELOLW\ 
Where financial instruments are a new tool, applicants may need intensive support. 
For equity financial instruments, in particular, investee companies may need ongoing 
mentoring, before and after investment, and equity finance is less successful where this 
support infrastructure is not developed (Cowling, 2012; Baldock and North, 2012). 
Demand-side policies to develop entrepreneurial and investment talent and networks are 
also critical and there is a strong need for information, advice and hands-on support 
(Wilson and Silva, 2013; NEA2F, 2013). Final recipients of microfinance may also need 
intensive support. Microloans from the ERDF co-financed NRW/EU Micro Loan Fund 
(Mikrodarlehen; Box 3) in Nordrhein-Westfalen in 2007-13 were conditional on the firm 
participating in an initial advisory session with the business advice organisation 
STARTERCENTER NRW, as well as ongoing coaching sessions with other business 
advisers. 
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Box 3. NRW/EU Micro Loan Fund 
The NRW/EU Micro Loan Fund (Mikrodarlehen) provides access to loan capital for start-ups 
and for the consolidation of young enterprises. The fund is managed by NRW.BANK, the Land 
investment bank, offering loans of EUR 5 000-25 000 to small and medium-sized enterprises. Loans 
were conditional on the firm participating in an initial advisory session with a business advice 
organisation as well as ongoing coaching sessions with other business advisers. The fund has been 
co-financed under the Nordrhein-Westfalen ERDF operational programme in 2007-13 and 2014-20. 
The need for technical assistance and knowledge transfer on what works is also true 
beyond the level of final recipients ± it is required between EU-level managing authorities 
and financial intermediaries/fund managers, as exemplified by fi-compass, the joint 
EC/EIB technical assistance platform.10  
Conclusions 
This paper has provided some insights into experiences with financial instruments 
using both purely domestic funds and co-financed with ESI funds. This final section 
returns to the key questions posed in the brief for this paper.  
1. Which sectors would benefit most from financial instruments, what limits  
the uptake of financial instruments in these sectors and how can they be 
encouraged to make greater use of them? 
There are essentially three dimensions to this question.  
First, regarding the ³sectors´ which would benefit the most from financial instruments, 
the key criteria are that: the activity must have the potential to be revenue-generating or 
cost-saving, but the market alone will not provide sufficient finance for it. A number of 
key policy objectives or goals potentially meet these criteria, notably: 
x Innovation, where substantial additional capital may be needed to validate and 
commercialise new products, processes or services, but where private market 
players are either unable to bear the level of risk involved or unable to assess it, 
potentially leading to suboptimal levels of investment in new technologies. 
x Support for SMEs, where different segments of the market face different challenges 
in accessing finance ± including lack of collateral, high transaction costs, credit 
rationing, information asymmetries ± which may lead to underinvestment. 
x Energy efficiency, where cost savings may accrue only over the very long term 
and may be subject to ³cultural´ barriers among private investors geared towards 
income generation rather than cost-optimisation projects ± potentially undermining 
wider climate change objectives. 
x Renewable energy, where large upfront capital investment maybe required, but 
projects require specialised appraisal and long-term financial returns are sensitive 
to changes in policies on tariffs ± resulting in underinvestment in infrastructure 
that could contribute to the achievement of renewable energy source targets. 
x Urban development, where projects which are individually insufficiently financially 
viable to access market funding may share risks with an urban development fund 
and generate wider benefits for disadvantaged areas, including remediation of 
brownfield sites and development of cultural or sports infrastructure.  
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Second, regarding limits to the uptake of financial instruments, implicit in this question is 
the suggestion that the use of financial instruments is insufficient. In practice, considerable 
use is made of financial instruments in domestic policy, though the scale and extent of this is 
very difficult to quantify. There are several different aspects to the question of uptake of 
financial instruments, the starting point for which is to consider ³uptake by whom?´ 
x Starting with the intended targets of financial instruments, a first consideration is 
the demand side. Is there a pipeline of investment projects of suitable quality that 
is not being serviced by private financial markets? The reluctance to engage with 
financial instruments, to the extent that this is indeed the case, varies by type of 
recipient, the purpose for which the financial instrument is available and the type 
of financial product. These different dimensions need to be explored at a level of 
detail that goes beyond the scope of this paper, but include: 
 reluctance to increase levels of indebtedness in the case of loans to firms  
 reluctance to relinquish control in the case of equity investment in small firms 
 split incentives in the case of some energy efficiency investments 
 unpredictability of the wider regulatory framework in the case of renewables 
 reluctance to take on debt and long payback periods in the case of energy 
efficiency schemes directed at householders. 
x Take-up of financial instruments may also be affected by the role of financial 
intermediaries, for whom the bureaucracy and specific requirements associated 
with implementing publicly backed financial instruments can act as a disincentive 
to their involvement. Management fees and costs need to be sufficient to attract 
the calibre of fund managers required ± or they need to consider that their 
involvement in implementing publicly backed schemes provides market-building 
opportunities in the longer term. 
x Within the specific context of Cohesion Policy, the Commission has encouraged 
the use of financial instruments, but this has not always been met with enthusiasm 
by managing authorities, even for activities where there appears to be potential. 
For instance, a recent survey of managing authorities which planned to support 
SMEs, but through grant support only, asked why they had eschewed financial 
instruments (Wishlade et al., 2017b). The most frequently cited reasons were: lack 
of demand from final recipients (i.e. SMEs); that financial instruments were 
unsuitable for planned projects; insufficient critical mass (i.e. the operational 
programme was too small); and lack of administrative capacity. Issues of critical 
mass and capacity were the subject of some discussion in the seminar, with some 
noting that a minimum fund size was required in order for funds to be efficient 
and to ensure that management costs were proportionate, whereas others noted 
that funds should be designed for the specific needs of the locality, including the 
overall scale of finance needed (as reflected in the ex ante assessment). This, in 
turn, raises the question of whether funds should be ³pooled´ at a larger 
administrative level in order to secure the capacity and economies of scale 
required. This highlights the tension between the need to design funds that are 
sufficiently responsive to local needs but large enough to be efficient and operated 
at an administrative level with the appropriate capacity.  
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The third element of this question concerns how to increase the uptake of financial 
instruments. Here the response to the question depends on the target to be persuaded. As 
discussed in the seminar, there is no ³one-size-fits-all´ solution, and careful tailoring is 
required to specific circumstances.  
For final recipients, the obstacles to take-up of financial instruments may be cultural 
or informational, related to a tradition of dependence on direct subsidies and/or a reluctance to 
take on debt, especially where the returns may accrue only in the very long term, as is the case 
for energy efficiency, for example. Key to shifting opinion, in addition to suitably designed 
instruments, are information and communication campaigns, as well as complementary 
measures such as consultancy and advisory support from credible sources.  
For financial intermediaries involved in the implementation of publicly backed financial 
instruments, the key issues concern the administrative demands made by involvement in 
such instruments, which come in addition to their own procedures and protocols, as well 
as wider financial regulations. In addition, the level of risk needs to be appropriately 
calibrated to be sufficiently attractive, and management costs and fees need to be set at 
levels that attract qualified intermediaries.  
At the level of domestic public administrations, as mentioned, significant use is 
already made of financial instruments of various types, but in the present context an 
important question is the extent to which it is attractive to implement the ESIF through 
financial instruments. There are arguably two main ways in which the uptake of financial 
instruments by ESIF managing authorities might be increased.  
The first is essentially cultural and relates to the need to shift to a presumption that 
support for projects that are potentially revenue-generating but that do not attract market 
funding should, in principle, be repayable. At present, managing authorities have to 
justify the use of financial instruments on the basis of an ex ante assessment; they do not 
have to justify the use of grant funding for the same type of projects.  
The second is the issue of legacy. This is an underexplored issue, which is a 
potentially significant incentive to managing authorities,. Legacy is promoted as one of 
the key benefits of financial instruments, and there is a requirement under the ESIF rules 
that returned funds are spent at least once in the operational programme area for a similar 
purpose. In practice, however, very little is known about how this is operationalised and 
the extent to which managing authorities actually have ³ownership´ and control of 
recycled funds; more understanding of the domestic rules regarding control of legacy 
funds could shed light on the incentives for managing authorities to use financial 
instruments. 
There are also some regulatory changes that could facilitate the use of financial 
instruments, and these are discussed in relation to Question 3.  
2. What are the institutional framework conditions and complementary policy 
measures that need to be in place to use financial instruments? 
The framework conditions and complementary measures required have already been 
discussed, and differ between policy areas ± for instance, the requirements for the 
successful implementation of financial instruments for energy efficiency in housing will 
be distinct from those for the promotion of innovation. For some types of financial 
instrument, regional or nationwide banking networks are required, while for others highly 
specialised fund managers with the expertise to assess small numbers of non-standard 
projects are essential. As such, it is not possible to generalise about the preconditions, 
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which must be the subject of a fine-grained approach linked to policy objectives. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, for any policy area and target recipient, financial 
instruments are but one financing option, and also that financing in any form needs to be 
part of an appropriately designed and focused strategy.  
In the case of support for SMEs, for example, financial instruments are only one 
component of the business support ecosystem. It is important to take account of the wider 
business support/entrepreneurship and innovation environment (and ensure its development), 
as these structures help develop a pipeline of projects and investible propositions. 
Publicly backed equity, in particular, is shown to be less likely to be successful where this 
support infrastructure is immature. More generally, however, there are important 
differences between and within countries in terms of the use and suitability of financial 
instruments of different types, as well as in the geography of access to finance. Demand-
side policies to develop entrepreneurial and investment talent and networks are critical 
and there is a need for information, advice and hands-on support; it is not simply a 
question of possible credit market imperfections, but also an inadequate flow of 
³bankable´ projects. Linked to this is a need for a co-ordinated approach between 
different government departments and the private sector, which may in turn reveal that 
support should be focused on developing investible propositions, as opposed to providing 
finance per se. It is also important for the SME ³support offer´ to be co-ordinated 
(e.g. financial instruments are not attractive when grants are available for similar 
purposes) and a plethora of schemes causes confusion for recipients. 
In the case of innovation and other specialised areas such as investment in renewable 
energy, specialised knowledge is required to assess investments; this too is likely to 
require a certain density of expertise in the local business environment. Where the target 
final recipients are individuals or householders, a widespread credible network of 
intermediaries is needed to advise recipients and deliver financial instruments.  
The development of a sound communication strategy that ensures that the initiatives 
concerned have the required profile among the intended final recipients is important for 
all types of intervention.  
3. How do regulatory frameworks promote or limit the use of financial 
instruments? 
The ESIF regulations provide a very specific context for the use of financial instruments 
that is distinct from, but interacts with, the domestic regulatory environment. In some 
respects it can be argued that the ESIF regulations actively facilitate the use of financial 
instruments ± setting out the requirements for an ex ante assessment (a requirement which 
has generally been regarded positively by managing authorities, as noted at the seminar 
and elsewhere) (Wishlade et al., 2017b) and outlining possible implementation options ± 
including templates in the form of so-called ³off-the-shelf´ instruments and encouraging 
uptake through low co-financing from domestic authorities. However, in many respects, 
the ESIF regulatory framework is problematic for managing authorities, and a number of 
specific constraints can be identified: 
x The seven-year programming period is an impediment to the operation of funds; 
this timescale is arbitrary and short, especially given the delays involved in the 
planning and approval of operational programmes. From an economic 
development perspective, there is no logic to the need to close funds at the end of 
the programming period, and retender for fund managers. 
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x Co-financed financial instruments tend to follow one of two models. First, an 
existing domestic mechanism is provided with an additional block of funding (for 
instance, a national promotional bank establishes an additional credit line), but 
this is essentially disbursed along the same or similar lines as existing domestic 
funding. Second, a bespoke fund is established in response to specific identified 
needs. The first option might be regarded as somewhat mundane since ESIFs are 
simply supplementing domestic funding streams, but this is not only a relatively 
quick and ³safe´ route to implementation, but it takes advantage of existing 
institutional and administrative capacity. The second approach is considerably more 
ULVN\ IURP WKH PDQDJLQJ DXWKRULW\¶V SRLQW RI view, and more time-consuming, 
though the outcome might be more innovative; it may also be necessary, since 
there may not be an existing domestic vehicle on which to ³piggy back´. The 
London Green Fund presented at the seminar is a good example of the second 
approach. In both cases, however, there are significant additional layers in the chain 
of command compared to purely domestic funding. These relate to monitoring, 
reporting and auditing requirements, all of which are typically distinct from 
purely domestic arrangements, and in the case of the first model outlined above, 
are additional to existing arrangements and auditing with the intermediary. In 
addition, ESIF co-financed measures are subject to more scrutiny than domestic 
measures in relation to state aid, potentially creating a disincentive to co-finance 
measures in the ³grey´ area of state aid definition, because of the political 
embarrassment associated with payment suspension in the case of non-compliance. 
x The combination of the short programming period and the N+3 requirements can 
conspire to make managing authorities more risk-averse. In operating ESIFs there 
is considerable emphasis on actually disbursing funds in order to ensure they are 
not lost. This can result in the prioritisation of ³shovel ready´ or ³safe´ projects. 
This may perversely encourage a situation where co-financed financial instruments 
are more likely to crowd-out private funding.  
4. What capacity do businesses and public administrations need to apply for  
and use financial instruments and how can it be strengthened? 
This question is closely linked to Question 3. As already mentioned, given the breadth 
of policy areas in which Cohesion Policy intervenes, there needs to be a detailed approach 
to analysing capacity needs ± for example, while national promotional banks and the retail 
sector can be used to implement standardised products, specialist appraisal of non-standard, 
large-scale investment is required. Moreover, the effective delegation of aspects of 
programme implementation requires careful oversight to ensure that programme objectives 
are met and not diverted or diluted by other actors, such as fund managers. 
At the level of final recipients, again as noted earlier, financial instruments need to be 
complemented by other inputs such as business advisory services in order to develop a 
pipeline of investible propositions in small firms, or energy audits to establish optimal 
forms of renovation for energy efficiency.  
5. How can the administrative burden of applying for and using financial 
instruments be reduced? 
It has become commonplace to bemoan the bureaucracy involved in implementing 
financial instruments under the ESIF. Crucially, however, there is an important trade-off 
between administrative burden and accountability; moreover, it is incumbent upon public 
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authorities to be able to demonstrate not only that public money has been spent properly, 
but also to be able to show whether it has been spent well ± and adjust policy accordingly 
if not. In the &RPPLVVLRQ¶VUHFHQWHYDOXDWLRQRIfinancial instruments for enterprises, few 
managing authorities had collected sufficient information to be able to evaluate the 
impact or efficiency of the measures they were financing ± this suggests that closer 
monitoring of financial instruments, potentially implying a greater burden, is required. 
However, there may be scope to reduce the burden on financial intermediaries by 
relying more on information collected through their own internal due diligence, reporting 
and audit requirements, rather than requiring additional information. As to final 
recipients, some managing authorities have suggested that applying for financial 
instruments is less onerous than for grants and that there is no real difference from 
applying for bank lending, for example. Some have also actively taken steps to ³hide the 
wiring´ from final recipients, though this may render the ultimate source of funding ± 
i.e. ESIF ± less visible, with implications for the public profile of ESIF spend.  
The need for accountability within a shared management system inevitably makes 
administration more onerous than it would be for purely domestic policy. Moreover, the 
effective delegation of some implementation responsibilities to actors outside the public 
administration heightens the need for appropriate checks to avoid ³objective drift´ ± 
managing authorities must ensure that the investment strategy is being followed by the 
fund manager in line with the objectives of the operational programme.  
This suggests that the scope to reduce the administrative burden may be limited. That 
said, a combination of experience, together with stability in the ESIF regulatory 
framework and some ³smoothing´, notably by removing the link between the lifetime of 
the operational programmes and the lifespan of the financial instruments, could reduce 
the administrative burden in the longer term. However, such concerns should not be at the 
expense of more and better quality data on implementation and results. To date, the 
dominance of operational and process issues has inhibited a better understanding of how 
ESIF financial instruments work, and the circumstances in which they work well.  
Notes 
 
1. This amounts to around EUR 17.8 billion when domestic co-financing is included. 
2. See the Open Portal Data for the European Structural and Investment Funds: 
https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu. 
3. A draft of this paper was prepared for the OECD seminar on 28 June 2017. This 
revised version takes account of discussions during the course of that seminar.  
4. Note that these are distinct from repayable grants or repayable assistance, where 
reimbursement is conditional on the outcome of the project.  
5. Despite having a rather different connotations in capital market terminology. 
6. This discussion draws on a recent study by Wishlade et al. (2017b).  
7. EU amount. 
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8. This predated the ex ante assessment of the need for financial instruments, which has 
become a mandatory component of the design and implementation of ESIF financial 
instruments in 2014-20. 
9.      www.evaluationsonline.org.uk/evaluations/Browse.do?ui=browse&action=show&id=57
7&taxonomy=INV (accessed in August 2017). 
10. https://www.fi-compass.eu (accessed in August 2017).  
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Annex A. 
Selected financial instruments 
Austria:  
ERP loan fund (Nat) 
The ERP Fund offers a range of support schemes for the business 
sector. Support takes the form of soft loans administered through the 
AWS (Austria Wirtschaftsservice GmbH, a federal Austrian 
development and financing bank).  
Belgium:  
BRUSOC (ERDF) 
A subsidiary of Finance.brussels, its mission is to support the creation 
and development of very small businesses in fragile neighbourhoods 
DQG WR VXSSRUW WKH UHJLRQ¶V VRFLDO LQWHJUDWLRQ LQLWLDWLYHV &R-financed 
with the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 2007-13.  
Estonia:  
Renovation loan 
(ERDF)  
Soft loans via KredEx aimed at housing associations or local 
government for the renovation of apartment buildings built before 1993, 
with flexible repayment periods and low interest rates to encourage 
UHQRYDWLRQZRUNWRUHGXFHEXLOGLQJV¶HQHUJ\FRQVXPSWLRQ&R-financed 
with the ERDF in 2007-13.  
France:  
Breizh up (ERDF) 
A co-investment fund in Brittany. The target companies will be young 
regional small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with innovation 
potential, primarily related to the areas of the regional Smart 
Specialisation Strategy. Co-financed with the ERDF in 2014-20.  
France:  
Bpi - Prêt économie 
sociale et solidaire 
(Nat) 
Unsecured loans to social enterprises at fixed rates of interest, generally 
for a maximum of EUR 50 000. 
France:  
Bpi - Prêt entreprises 
et quartiers (Nat) 
Unsecured loans for SMEs located in disadvantaged urban areas at fixed 
rates of interest, generally for a maximum of EUR 50 000. 
France:  
JEREMIE 
Languedoc-Roussillon 
(ERDF) 
A holding fund set up with ERDF co-financing in 2007-13, supporting 
SMEs via a seed loan instrument, a co-investment (equity) instrument 
and a guarantee instrument. 
Germany:  
Aufstiegs-BAfoG 
loans (Nat) 
A combination of grant and loan for living expenses when undergoing 
full-time professional development, covering also course and 
examination fees. 
Germany: 
KfW syndicated loan 
for energy and 
environment (Nat) 
Loans available through banks for large-scale investment projects in 
Germany in the areas of energy efficiency, innovative projects in the 
areas of energy conservation, electricity generation, storage and 
transmission as well as the use of renewable energies. 
Germany:  
KfW Energy 
Efficiency 
Programme (Nat) 
Loans at favourable interest rates through banks to finance investments 
in energy efficiency measures for: production facilities and processes; 
waste heat; and energy efficient construction or refurbishment.  
Germany: 
KfW Renewables 
Energy Programme 
(Nat) 
Low-interest loans through banks for plants in which power or heat is 
generated from renewable energies and installations of stationary 
battery storage systems combined with photovoltaic systems.  
Hungary:  
Combined 
Co-financed with the ERDF in 2007-13, supported micro and small 
businesses with combined small loans and grants. 
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Microcredit scheme 
(ERDF) 
Lithuania:  
ENEF (ERDF) 
The Energy Efficiency Fund (ENEF) supports energy savings with 
loans for public infrastructure investment (modernisation of central 
government buildings and street lighting). The ENEF is managed by 
VIPA, the Public Investment Development Agency. Co-financed with 
the ERDF in 2014-20. 
Lithuania:  
INVEGA Guarantee 
Fund (ERDF) 
Guarantees for SMEs co-funded under the ERDF in 2007-13. 
Portugal:  
Venture capital funds 
under the OP 
COMPETE (ERDF) 
In 2007-13, 23 venture capital funds were co-financed from the ERDF 
under the OP COMPETE, these were divided into six main categories: 
innovation and internationalisation; audiovisual; early stages; pre-seed; 
corporate venture captial and ³Revive´(expansion projects). 
Slovak Republic: 
JESSICA (ERDF) 
Soft loans for the renovation of apartment buildings to improve energy 
efficiency through the State Fund for Housing Development. 
Co-financed with the ERDF in 2007-13. 
Spain:  
FIDAE (ERDF)  
JESSICA FIDAE provided long-term senior debt to public entities, 
energy service companies (ESCOs), private enterprises or public-private 
partnerships through three commercial banks, for projects related to: 
energy efficiency and energy management; thermal solar energy, 
photovoltaic solar energy and biomass; or clean transport which 
contributed to energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy. Co-
financed with the ERDF in 2007-13.  
Spain:  
ICO (ERDF) 
The Instituto de Crédito Oficial (ICO) provides technological loan 
funds, mainstream loan funds and guarantee funds.  
Sweden:  
Green Fund (ERDF) 
Will provide risk capital to invest in innovative SMEs involved in 
developing or providing products and services that reduce CO2 
emissions. Co-financed with the ERDF in 2014-20. 
United Kingdom: 
Career development 
loans (Nat) 
Bank loans to pay for courses and training, usually offered at a reduced 
interest rate. The government pays the interest until after the course, 
after which the recipient repays the loan and interest. 
United Kingdom: 
Enterprise Guarantee 
Fund (Nat) 
Provides government-backed guarantees to accredited lenders 
(including high street banks) to encourage them to lend to smaller 
businesses that are viable but unable to obtain finance due to 
insufficient security. 
United Kingdom: 
Green Deal (Nat) 
A government scheme that provided loans to households to finance 
energy-efficient home improvements, to be paid back through the 
savings made on energy bills. Government support for the scheme 
ceased in 2015. 
United Kingdom: 
Low-Carbon 
Innovation Fund 
(ERDF) 
A venture capital fund providing equity finance for SMEs on a 
co-investment basis in the East of England for investments with an 
impact on carbon reduction. Co-financed with the ERDF in 2007-13.   
United Kingdom: 
Start-up loans (Nat) 
Government-backed unsecured personal loans available to individuals 
looking to start or grow a business accompanied by 12 months of free 
mentoring. Administered by a subsidiary of the British Business Bank 
through a network of delivery partners. 
 
